



Milwaukee Police Department
Police Administration Building
749 West State Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233
<http://www.milwaukee.gov/police>

Alfonso Morales
Chief of Police

(414) 933-4444

August 28, 2019

MuckRock News
DEPT MR 74467
411A Highland Ave
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Dear Emma Best:

This letter is in response to your public records request pursuant to the provisions of the Wisconsin Public Records Law (Wis. Stat. § 19.31-39). In your letter dated May 30, 2019, you requested the following information:

- See attached request re: Anonymous + general hacktivists 2009-2018.

The public policy in this state is to give the public the greatest amount of access to public records as possible. Wis. Stat. § 19.32. The general presumption is that public records are open to the public unless there is a clear statutory or common law exception. If there is no clear statutory or common law exception the custodian must "decide whether the strong presumption favoring access and disclosure is overcome by some even stronger public policy favoring limited access or nondisclosure." *Hempel v. City of Baraboo*, 2005 WI 120, ¶ 28 (citations omitted.) Notwithstanding the presumption of openness, the public's right to access to public records is not absolute. *Journal/Sentinel v. Agerup*, 145 Wis. 2d 818, 822 (Ct. App. 1988).

At this time, your request is denied.

"Documents mentioning or relating to Anonymous (the hacker movement/collective...) or hacktivism (defined as hacking as a form of protest and/or activism) generated between 1 January 2009 and 1 January 2019..."

Your request also provided some specificity as to the types of records you wished the Milwaukee Police Department ("MPD") to search for.

Having now had a chance to estimate the sheer number of records that are potentially responsive to your request, I have determined that your request is excessively burdensome.

Wisconsin courts have ruled that a public records request that is excessively burdensome can appropriately be denied under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h). Such a request can be denied when responding represents a burden far beyond that which may reasonably be required of a custodian of a public record. *Schopper v. Gehling*, 210 Wis. 2d 208, 210 (Ct. App. 1997). The purpose of the limitation found under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h) is to "prevent a situation where a request unreasonably burdens a record custodian, requiring the custodian to spend excessive amounts of time and resources deciphering and responding to a request." *State ex rel. Gehl v. Connors*, 2007 WI App 238, ¶ 17. A request should include sufficient specificity so the custodian does not have to guess at what a requester is seeking. *Seifert v. School Dist. of Sheboygan Falls*, 2007 WI App 207, ¶ 42, 305 Wis. 2d 582, 740 N.W. 2d 177. Compliance with the Public Records Law should not "so burden the records custodian that the normal functioning of the office would be severely impaired." *Schopper*, 210 Wis. 2d at 213.

In this instance, our IT department, going through 10 years of e-mails, and using the search Anonymous, identified 2,249 potentially responsive records. A search was also performed of the word "Anonymous" in MPD's record management system; however, the computer froze after hitting 4,000 results. It is likely that most of these records are unrelated to the hacker movement/collective that you have identified; however, there is no way to determine that without reviewing each record. At a minimum, this is 6,249 records, many of which are multiple pages long, which would have to be reviewed to determine whether they are responsive to your request, and then, if so, potentially redacted. MPD would also have to review records other than e-mails and reports. You have also requested bulletins, warnings, alerts, records from the FBI, Homeland Security, or any other federal agency, and additional materials. Even removing the items you requested that are not "records," as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), this is a monumental amount of material to go through.


While responding to public records requests is an important function of this office, it is not this office's only important function. I fully agree with the policy of this state that government records are open to the public (subject to statutory, common law, and public policy exceptions); however, the sheer scope of your request and the number of potentially responsive records that would have to be reviewed and potentially redacted makes your request unreasonable. Having to go through thousands, if not tens of thousands, of pages of potentially responsive records would unreasonably burden this office such that its normal functioning would be severely impaired. Consequently, I am denying your request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Please note that we also performed a search in our record management system for the term "hacktivism," but no records were identified that included that search term.

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.34(4)(b), the above determinations are subject to review by mandamus action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1), or upon application to the Wisconsin Attorney General or the Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel.
Sincerely,

Sincerely,

ALFONSO MORALES
CHIEF OF POLICE



KERRY NAMIN
POLICE SERGEANT

AM:KN:sw
J10066 Response Letter

Wisconsin Open Records Act Request: Anonymous + general hacktivists 2009-2018 (Milwaukee Police Department)

74467-12952289@requests.muckrock.com

Thu 5/30/2019 2:06 PM

To: Records, Open <mpdopenrecords@milwaukee.gov>

1 attachments (482 KB)

A-0010-NCCIC-BULLETIN.pdf;

Milwaukee Police Department
ORA Office
P.O. Box 531
Milwaukee, WI 53210

May 30, 2019

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to the Wisconsin Open Records Act, I hereby request the following records:

Documents mentioning or relating to Anonymous (the hacker movement/collective, see below) or hacktivism (defined as hacking as a form of protest and/or activism) generated between 1 January 2009 and 1 January 2019, including but not limited to:

- * Internal reports, bulletins, warnings and alerts relating to Anonymous or hacktivism
- * Reports from the appropriate IT (Information Technology) or computer offices regarding possible cyber attacks by Anonymous or other hacktivists
- * Reports, bulletins, warnings and alerts sent to or received from either the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, any fusion center or federal agency relating to or mentioning Anonymous or hacktivism
- * Incident reports investigating possible hacking activity falling within the office's jurisdiction and allegedly carried out by members of Anonymous or other hacktivist groups
- * Materials generated as a result of any suspected or actual compromise, breach or "dox" (revealing of personal or private information) by Anonymous or other hacktivists

Anonymous has been described by government agencies as a non-hierarchical hacktivist collective, Anonymous uses hacking (and arguably cracking) techniques to register political protest in campaigns known as "#ops." Best known for their distributed denial of services (DDoS) attacks, past activities have included attacks against the Church of Scientology; Visa, Paypal, and others who withdrew their services from WikiLeaks' Julian Assange after that group began releasing war documents; #OpTunisia and others purporting to support the Arab Spring; and a campaign that brought down the website of the Westboro Baptist Church. #Ops are usually marked with the release of a video of a reader in a Guy Fawkes

J. Dodelo

mask using a computer generated voice. See attached for additional background information.

I am a member of the news media and request classification as such. I have previously written about the government and its activities, with some reaching over 100,000 readers. As such, as I have a reasonable expectation of publication and my editorial and writing skills are well established. In addition, I discuss and comment on the files online and make them available through non-profits such as the Internet Archive and MuckRock, disseminating them to a large audience. While my research is not limited to this, a great deal of it, including this, focuses on the activities and attitudes of the government itself. As such, it is not necessary for me to demonstrate the relevance of this particular subject in advance.

As my primary purpose is to inform about government activities by reporting on it and making the raw data available, I request that fees be waived.

The requested documents will be made available to the general public, and this request is not being made for commercial purposes.

In the event that there are fees, I would be grateful if you would inform me of the total charges in advance of fulfilling my request. I would prefer the request filled electronically, by e-mail attachment if available or CD-ROM if not.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. I look forward to receiving your response to this request within 10 business days.

Sincerely,

Emma Best

Filed via MuckRock.com

E-mail (Preferred): 74467-12952289@requests.muckrock.com

Upload documents directly: https://accounts.muckrock.com/accounts/login/?next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.muckrock.com%2Faccounts%2Flogin%2F%3Fnext%3D%252Faccounts%252Fagency_login%252Fmilwaukee-police-department-653%252Fanonymous-general-hacktivists-2009-2018-milwaukee-police-department-74467%252F%253Femail%253Dmpdopenrecords%252540milwaukee.gov&url_auth_token=AAVzfaRyXCKHY6hk-qPhCrBLjc%3A1hWQNB%3AAzqNzs9n1Ds71b3hT9t4IexKAAQ
Is this email coming to the wrong contact? Something else wrong? Use the above link to let us know.

For mailed responses, please address (see note):

MuckRock News

DEPT MR 74467

411A Highland Ave

Somerville, MA 02144-2516

PLEASE NOTE: This request is not filed by a MuckRock staff member, but is being sent through MuckRock by the above in order to better track, share, and manage public records

requests. Also note that improperly addressed (i.e., with the requester's name rather than "MuckRock News" and the department number) requests might be returned as undeliverable.

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NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER BULLETIN

A-0010-NCCIC -160020110719

DISTRIBUTION NOTICE (A): THIS PRODUCT IS INTENDED FOR THE CYBERSECURITY, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND / OR KEY RESOURCES COMMUNITY AT LARGE.

"ANONYMOUS" AND ASSOCIATED HACKER GROUPS CONTINUE TO BE SUCCESSFUL USING RUDIMENTARY EXPLOITS TO ATTACK PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) This Bulletin is being provided for your Executive Leadership, Operational Management, and Security Administrators situational awareness. The actors who make up the hacker group "Anonymous" and several likely related offshoots like "LulzSec", continue to harass public and private sector entities with rudimentary exploits and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) commonly associated with less skilled hackers referred to as "Script Kiddies"¹. Members of Anonymous routinely claim to have an overt political agenda and have justified at least a portion of their exploits as retaliation for perceived 'social injustices' and 'freedom of speech' issues. Attacks by associated groups such as LulzSec have essentially been executed entirely for their and their associates' personal amusement, or in their own hacker jargon "for the lulz".

(U) Anonymous insist they have no centralized operational leadership, which has been a significant hurdle for government and law enforcement entities attempting to curb their actions. With that being said, we assess with high confidence that Anonymous and associated groups will continue to exploit vulnerable publicly available web servers, web sites, computer networks, and other digital information mediums for the foreseeable future.

(U) So far, Anonymous has not demonstrated any capability to inflict damage to critical infrastructure, instead choosing to harass and embarrass its targets. However, some members of LulzSec have demonstrated moderately higher levels of skill and creativity, evidenced in attacks using combinations of methods and techniques to target multiple networks. To date, their attacks have largely resulted in the release of sensitive documents and personally identifiable information. These attacks have the potential to result in serious harm, particularly to Law Enforcement and other Federal, State and Local Government personnel who may be targeted as a result. Also, this assessment does not take into account the



¹ Script Kiddie: Unskilled individuals who use scripts or programs developed by others to attack computer systems and networks and deface websites.

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(U) Should a cyber attack occur, ensure backup and recovery procedures are in place and enabled. Be prepared to execute a full spectrum defensive plan that includes contact information for external sources to draw on for assistance. Collect and centrally manage detailed aspects of the attack so you can provide accurate information to Operations, Security, and Law Enforcement personnel as necessary. Such a plan may also include materials identifying who to contact at your Internet service provider, possibly via alternate means, and at any time of day or night to minimize the duration and effect of a cyber attack. Similarly, have contact information readily available for public and private entities to draw on for assistance: the NCCIC, US-CERT, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, local FBI Field Office, applicable Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC), and Sector Specific Agency.

(U) For the situational awareness of F/S/L/T/T and CIKR partners, below are URLs to the National and Cyber Threat Levels the NCCIC monitors.

- National Terrorism Advisory System: <http://www.dhs.gov/alerts>
- NCRAI: Contact NCCIC Watch & Warning (NCCIC@HQ.dhs.gov)
- MS-ISAC: <http://www.msisac.org/index.cfm>
- IT-ISAC: <https://www.it-isac.org/>
- ES-ISAC: <http://www.esisac.com/>
- FS-ISAC: <http://www.fsisac.com/>

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(U) While the U.S. Government doesn't endorse a particular solution, identifying vendors with experience combating such an attack may reduce the time it takes to get assistance mitigating such an attack and restoring service or operations. Additionally, the US-CERT web page offers a wide variety of technical and non-technical information to make use of both before and after an incident:

<http://www.us-cert.gov/nav/t01/>

(U) A variety of documents with information regarding defensive measures to combat a computer network attack are available at:

http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/

(U) Many organizations can suffer financial loss as a result of a cyber attack and may wish to pursue criminal or civil charges against the intruder. For legal advice, we recommend that you consult with your legal counsel and law enforcement.

(U) Data breaches which involve a monetary loss or include a financial nexus such as a compromise to your financial, credit or debit accounts, or personal information can be reported to the U.S. Secret Service for criminal investigation. For more information contact your local Secret Service Field Office for assistance.

http://www.secretservice.gov/field_offices.shtml

(U) U.S. persons and companies interested in pursuing an investigation of a cyber attack can contact their local FBI field office for guidance and information. For contact information for your local FBI field office, please consult your local telephone directory or see the FBI's contact information web page:

<http://www.fbi.gov/contactus.htm>

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(U) Non-U.S. entities may need to discuss malicious cyber activity with their local law enforcement agency to determine the appropriate steps that should be taken with regard to pursuing an investigation.

(U) U.S. Federal Government Departments and Agencies should report cyber attacks and incidents to US-CERT. Non-U.S. F/S/L/T/T Government Departments and Agencies interested in determining the source of certain types of cyber attacks may require the cooperation of your internet service provider and the administrator of the attacked networks. Tracking an intruder this way may not always be possible. If you are interested in trying to do so, contact your service provider directly, as the US-CERT is not able to provide this type of assistance. We do encourage you to report your experiences, however. This helps the NCCIC and US-CERT understand the nature and scope of security incidents on the Internet, and we may be able to relate your report to other activity that has been reported to us.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(U) **Anonymous** - (used as a mass noun) is an Internet meme originating 2003 on the imageboard 4chan, representing the concept of many online community users simultaneously existing as an anarchic, digitized global brain. It is also generally considered to be a blanket term for members of certain Internet subcultures, a way to refer to the actions of people in an environment where their actual identities are not known.

(U) **Lulz** - often used to denote laughter at someone who is the victim of a prank, or a reason for performing an action. This variation is often used on the 'Oh Internet' wiki and '4chan' image boards.

(U) **Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)** - an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the means to carry out, motives for, and targets of a DDoS attack may vary, it generally consists of the concerted efforts of person or persons to prevent an Internet site or service from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely.

(U) **Hacktivist** - a portmanteau of *hack* and *activism*.

POINTS OF CONTACT

(U) This was produced as a collaborative effort between the NCCIC Components and Functional Groups (US-CERT, ICS-CERT, NCS/NCC, I&A/CISD/CTAB).

(U) Please direct questions to the NCCIC Duty Officer (NDO). NCCIC will continue to coordinate with the appropriate component organizations listed below:

NCCIC Duty Officer	US-CERT	NCS/NCC	ICS-CERT
NCCIC@HQ.dhs.gov	SWO@US-CERT.gov	NCS@HQ.dhs.gov	ICS-CERT-SOC@dhs.gov
(703) 235-8831	(703)235-8832/8833	(703) 235-5080	(877) 776-7585

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Computer network defenders the opportunity to pro-actively supplement their computer network defenses and provide awareness to management, employees, and partners. For example, cybersecurity experts who have analyzed previous Anonymous attacks have noted there was a significant amount of reconnaissance prior to the attack. Other cybersecurity experts have recommended that public and private sector entities go through the same steps hackers would to determine the extent of attack surface available to a malicious actor. An example of this might entail using internet search engines like Google^(USPER) to identify sensitive information and computer network vulnerabilities that have been cached as they catalogue the content of the WWW.

ANTICIPATED FUTURE TARGETS

(U) Members of the group LulzSec were possibly associated with the 15 June 2011 DDOS attack on the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) public-facing website. Although no information was stolen or released to the public, and the website was not defaced, the site was targeted in a manner consistent with other LulzSec and Anonymous attacks. Anonymous also declared that the group was at "war" with the Intelligence Community (IC) and has identified it as a future target. Anonymous is likely targeting the IC because it views it as violating its core belief in total freedom of information. Additionally, following the release of government e-mail account data from the July 2011 Booz Allen compromise, an Anonymous operator stated on Twitter that, "We are working on two of the biggest releases for Anonymous in the last 4 years. Put your helmets on. It is war."

(U) Anonymous has also stated its intent to target companies related to certain Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources sectors. On 12 July 2011, Anonymous released personally identifiable information of approximately 2500 employees of U.S. Agricultural Company Monsanto, and claimed to have taken down corporate web assets and mail servers. Additionally, in a separate statement on 12 July 2011, Anonymous declared their intention to attack several U.S., Canadian, and British companies, including Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips, who were associated with development of oil sands in Alberta, Canada.

(U) Future attacks are likely to continue but will likely remain limited in scope due to a lack of advanced capabilities. These attacks are also likely to target the Federal government and critical infrastructure sectors, particularly in response to publicized events relating to civil liberties, cyber security, or allegations of censorship (online or otherwise).

THE WAY AHEAD

(U) Some members of LulzSec have demonstrated moderately higher levels of skill and creativity that include using combinations of methods and techniques to target multiple networks. This does not take into account the possibility of a higher-level actor providing LulzSec or Anonymous more advanced capabilities. Therefore, it may be advisable to adjust monitoring of both internal and external resources for indications of a pending or ongoing attack on cyber or telecommunications networks.

(U) The NCCIC recommends that U.S., Federal/State/Local/Tribal/Territorial Departments and Agencies, and private sector partners ensure they have processes in place to notify their leadership and network operators if their organization becomes a possible target by hacktivists or other malicious actors, and what notifications they are required or plan to make in the event of an attack.

with the Bit Torrent⁴ site The Pirate Bay, set up a pro-Iranian Green Party website where internet users could voice support for Iranians who were protesting the election results. In 2009 and early 2010 (respectively), Anonymous also conducted DDOS attacks targeting the Governments of Germany and Australia.

(U) Anonymous increased its notoriety in 2010 with high-profile attacks motivated by the arrest of U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning in connection to Wikileaks, releasing several thousand classified U.S. government documents on the internet. Though Anonymous's past actions indicate these cyber attacks should have been motivated by Anonymous's views on freedom of speech, their public statements indicated that the intent was to retaliate against mistreatment of Pvt. Manning while he was in U.S. custody.

(U) Anonymous' activities increased throughout 2011 with a number of high-profile attacks targeting both public and private sector entities. Several of these attacks utilized DDoS as their primary tool, while others relied on cross-site scripting exploits to conduct website defacements. Interestingly, Anonymous justified nearly all of their attacks conducted between 2010 and 2011 by citing social or political injustices by each victim organization.

(U) In 2011, a group of relatively more talented individuals spun off from Anonymous to form the hacker group "LulzSec," to which has been attributed several high profile exploitation/attack incidents involving public and private sector organizations. Though LulzSec initially claimed to operate independently of Anonymous, it became clear that the level of coordination between the two groups was greater than initially thought. Upon completing what they termed a "voyage" of hacking for a period of time, it is confirmed that a small cohort of LulzSec returned to Anonymous.



TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

(U) Anonymous utilizes the internet to recruit and train new personnel, conduct reconnaissance on potential targets, exploit vulnerabilities found in information systems, deny access to resources, alter information presented by organizations, and steal sensitive information. Though the TTPs and tools employed by Anonymous are commonly thought to be rudimentary and unsophisticated, their success to date executing operations and gaining media attention is on par with high profile incidents allegedly involving sophisticated "Advanced Persistent Threat" (APT) actors. They have relied on taking advantage of weaknesses in applications, thus allowing them to bypass, at least initially, conventional network defenses such as firewalls and anti-virus applications to access sensitive data. Additionally, Anonymous and closely associated groups appear to be building upon recent successes by conducting highly visible messaging campaigns over publicly available social media forums such as Twitter^(USPER), YouTube^(USPER), and Facebook^(USPER).

(U) Anonymous and associated groups pride themselves on being 'social media' savvy, and routinely use forums such as Twitter, Facebook, and public web pages to announce intended targets, ongoing attack results, and post files stolen from victim computer networks. These announcements can provide

⁴ Bit Torrent: A Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Protocol.

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possibility of a higher-level actor providing Anonymous, LulzSec or a similar group with more advanced capabilities.

BACKGROUND

(U) Anonymous emerged in 2003 on the internet message board / web forum 4chan as a collective group of individuals whose primary purpose was to operate in complete anonymity (as the group name implies), and carry out random acts across the web for their collective amusement. Since then, Anonymous has conducted a number of malicious cyber acts and employed a variety of TTPs (discussed later). In their earlier years, Anonymous' acts seemed to be somewhat random; it wasn't until 2008 that Anonymous became associated with hacktivist² activities.



(U) Anonymous' lack of a centralized leadership structure and distributed (often international) personnel poses a significant hurdle for law enforcement organizations hoping to curb the flow of cyber attacks against organizations. Additionally, international law governing cyber crime varies between countries, and often times, attributing malicious activities to cyber operators is difficult.

(U) Though Anonymous' hacktivist activities are commonly reported to have started in 2008, the group has claimed responsibility for several other cyber attacks motivated by "social injustices" as early as 2006. It wasn't until their

distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on the Church of Scientology's public facing website (which Anonymous justified as being in retaliation to perceived violations of American's right to freedom of speech) that the group began to garner significant media attention and internet notoriety. Several attacks against other organizations in 2008 followed the attack targeting the Church of Scientology's website, though it is difficult to judge Anonymous's intent behind the attacks³. Anonymous also organized several physical protests in response to the alleged Church of Scientology censorship campaign (pictured above).



(U) 2009 brought new opportunities for Anonymous to flex their newfound hacktivism muscle, with at least two attacks targeting organizations that Anonymous viewed as pro-censorship, and involvement in protests in response to the 2009 Iranian elections, where Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was named the winner despite discrepancies in the number of votes. Anonymous, in collaboration



² Hacktivist: The nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends. These tools include web site defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, web site parodies, virtual sit-ins, and virtual sabotage.¹

³ Later 2008 attacks included random acts of malice such as an invasion of a public web forum for the Epilepsy Foundation, and attacks against Support Online Hip Hop/All Hip Hop.

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